Reengaging Sudan

Regional diplomatic and humanitarian progress in the Darfur territories continues to be ineffectual and slow. Darfur’s camps are becoming increasingly overcrowded and dangerous, and the numbers of murdered and displaced persons steadily increase with each passing day. According to United Nations estimates, over 200,000 innocents have perished and close to 2.5 million have fled their homes and villages in an effort to escape the brutality.

Casualties are now being felt on all sides. Even the humanitarian service workers, who are usually protected with tight private security as part of their nongovernmental status, are not safe. Recent atrocities committed by regional rebels exacerbate this highly unstable situation. Just last week, ten African Union peacekeepers were murdered and dozens more kidnapped in a highly organized and bloody operation close to Nyala in the central region of Darfur. This attack comes on the heels of a recently introduced three-stage joint United Nations/African Union peacekeeping mission slated to commence responsibilities this month, and a highly anticipated inter-state conference on how to address the conflict, which will take place in Libya at October’s end.

In Sudan, the social apparatus is dislodged, the national economy is in complete disrepair, and the political situation speaks for itself. I hate to believe that Sudan is relegated to failed state status. After all, unlike its violent counterpart, Somalia, Sudan has vital natural resources that have the potential to help the nation stand on its own two feet so long as the violence is dramatically diminished and the government embraces neoliberal, market-driven economic policies.

It will be decades before Sudan as a whole can achieve social and economic prosperity. Even in the southern regions of Juba and Rumbek, where a cease-fire between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement has been effectively implemented, the remnants of a bloody, prolonged twenty-year ethnic and civil fratricide is more apparent than ever. This is Africa’s longest running civil war to date.

Like Darfur, there is little if any functioning infrastructure, the economy is completely fractured, and disease and poverty are rampant. Underdevelopment is an understatement. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed into effect in January 2005 and monitored by the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, has done little to stem the tide of intermittent violence and economic exploitation by the Khartoum government. It is in danger of collapse, however, due to government sabotage and international neglect, the latter a cruel irony in that preoccupation to conclude the CPA negotiations led to initial reluctance to address the developing Darfur crisis in 2003-2004.

Despite its drawbacks, the CPA has been firmly enmeshed in social and political affairs within these areas. Two initiatives need to be pursued to expedite the dividends that urgently need to be provided. First, an increased United Nations and African Union peacekeeping force should be embedded in the areas deemed vulnerable to security breaches. This does not mean moving personnel from Darfur over to the south. It means withdrawing emphasis from an aid-based led mission to one steeped in peacekeeping strategy. Once the security situation is firmly addressed, the hybrid force and UNMIS must then turn to enhancing the South’s stated right of political and economic self-determination. Sharing needed resources and decision-making capabilities with the repressive central government is detrimental to the pursuance of democratization and a respectable human rights situation. As Africa’s largest country, it is unacceptable to allow the plight of the Sudanese people to fall by the wayside. Many think that finding a peaceable solution to Sudan’s conflicts is a means to an end. This notion cannot be more wrong. If the international community is to allow stagnation to perpetuate, this only invites the possibility for renewed conflicts to erupt.

The Darfur conflict has grown increasingly complex. The violence has often been characterized as government-backed Arab tribes slaughtering non-Arab tribes, and four years ago, when the heavy fighting began, that may have been the best simplification of what was happening. But recently, Arab tribes have begun fighting Arab tribes, rebels have begun fighting rebels and armed men who seem to have no allegiances are attacking whoever crosses their path.

Understanding that much of the international community has signed on to condemn the conflict, it is critical that these global actors use their leveraging capacities to become potent arbiters and power brokers. The changing character of the Darfur crisis requires this.

The talks scheduled to take place on October 27 in Tripoli, Libya will mark definitive peace talks to end this four-year massacre. United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon is one of the most outspoken advocates for peace in the region. He has emphasized that the Tripoli meeting is of capital importance noting, “The forthcoming political negotiation in Libya must be a conclusive one, a final phase for a final settlement. All the leaders of the movements and concerned parties must participate. This was a consensus opinion.” But, while this conference holds major symbolic importance, we must not be mistaken as to how difficult it will be to develop a cohesive peace solution between the Sudanese government and the splintered rebel factions.

The hybrid United Nations-African Union peacekeeping mission set for deployment this month is a solid effort resulting from numerous stalled talks and bickering between major players in the conflict. The UNAMID operation will effectively seek to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, uphold human rights and adherence to the rule of law, and ensure the protection of its personnel and civilians. Enforcing the Darfur Peace Agreement is critical. First, it was signed by Darfur’s largest rebel group, the Sudan Liberation Movement, and second, it calls for the complete, verifiable disarmament and demobilization of the Khartoum sponsored Janjaweed militia.

UNAMID has the potential to be one of the more potent peacekeeping operations undertaken in recent history. While the operation is expected to achieve its benchmarks of initial deployment by early January, it must first overcome some of its key missing capacities. Critical ground transport and aviation are lacking. If these aspects are not delivered, the mission’s ability to carry out its work will be seriously impeded.

It is important that tangible progress be made very soon. Allowing this conflict to continue when conciliation and compromise have ostensibly been met provides very little excuse for international actors to make. The United Nations can only rely on sanctions to such an extent until it realizes there lack of utility and persuasion. Peace not only in Darfur, but throughout Sudan hinges on remaining optimistic, successful establishment of the CPA, halting the violence, and including all Sudan’s voices.