A Domestic Solution for Iraq

These past two weeks have marked a new stage in the Iraqi war. First, the Independent Commission on Iraqi Security Forces published its report. Chaired by retired General James Jones, the panel offered a bleak view of the readiness of Iraq’s army and police in taking over security obligations. The Commission estimates that it will take at least a year before American-led forces can scale back its critical leadership role. Second, and most significant, are the testimonies given last week by Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus. While not surprising to everyone involved, their speeches nonetheless let all Americans know that our military presence in Iraq will be prolonged for well after President Bush leaves office. While American forces are likely to be depleted to 130,000 by next July (pre-surge levels), our military’s cemented role remains very unclear. According to Petraeus, “Our experience in Iraq has repeatedly shown that projecting too far into the future is not just difficult, it can be misleading and even hazardous.”

With such high anticipation for these testimonies, is it justifiable that not even the most eminent generals and civilian leaders involved in the conflict have any answers? The existence of this ambivalence is a testament to just how chaotic this conflict has become.

Despite marginal military progress being made through the targeted surge in some of the most violent regions like Diyala and Anbar provinces, there is zero success in forming a functional Iraqi government. Expedient political and military solutions are not mutually exclusive. If anything, strengthening this loose coalition of militias, led by a seemingly disorganized Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, will breathe fresh air into achieving sectarian reconciliation and political progress.

Maliki, once heralded by Bush as “the right guy for Iraq”, has been consistently disappointing in previous weeks. Recent cabinet defections and the withdrawal of the Allawi-led secular political alliance, Iraqiya, are huge blows to the Iraqi government’s credibility. Even more depressing, this internal factionalism is serving to sever any prospects for compromise. Allawi is now working to establish a civil opposition force, telling Wolf Blitzer on CNN’s Late Edition that he has ''lost faith in the capability of the current government in salvaging the country and moving forward.''

Maliki’s work in Iraq should not come with a blank check. Only when he realizes his expendability will we see a reduction in ethnic factionalism amongst his country and his dislocated cabinet. Bush must start making some smart moves and fast. Deposing Maliki will inch us closer to establishing a stable political solution. Bush’s national security adviser, Stephen Hadley, recently wrote in a private memo, “The reality on the streets suggests Maliki is either ignorant of what’s going on, misrepresenting his intentions or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient.” Regardless of Maliki’s misgivings, Bush’s open criticism of the current Iraqi regime may just be a strategic maneuver to push the White House firmly back into the center of the Iraq debate.

With Maliki’s ouster unlikely to occur, we need to focus on other options at hand. The prospect for an American military solution in the region is possible, but will only occur with Sunni reconciliation. Anbar is a good example of these benefits: tribal leaders and Sunni militia fighters have joined U.S. forces to rid their respective territories of terrorist threats.

But, this is not even close to enough, especially when considering that while Al Qaeda may be unpopular in Anbar, Americans fair just as bad. Gary Langer of ABC News Polling writes in The New York Times, “Withdrawal timetable aside, every Anbar respondent in our survey opposed the presence of American forces in Iraq — 69 percent ‘strongly’ so. Every Anbar respondent called attacks on coalition forces ‘acceptable,’ far more than anywhere else in the country. All called the United States-led invasion wrong, including 68 percent who called it ‘absolutely wrong.’ No wonder: Anbar, in western Iraq, is almost entirely populated by Sunni Arabs, long protected by Saddam Hussein and dispossessed by his overthrow.”

Unitary American involvement is not the solution. It’s time to give the Iraqis back their land, their freedom, and their ideals. This can still be accomplished with U.S. ground forces playing auxiliary roles wherever possible. Petraeus and his subordinates must start finding ways to prop up tribal leaders and make them responsive to their own peoples. Reengaging strong provincial leadership within the periphery will establish and strengthen Iraqi confidence in the democratic process.

The American military and Iraqi leaders are best served by continuing the training protocols of the ISF. Anthony Cordesman, one of the leading experts on the Iraq war and senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a DC-based foreign policy think-tank, remains positive, noting that “ISF development can succeed in many areas if the US is patient, willing to put in years of further effort, and realistic in its goals and efforts.” Everyone must understand that providing stability in Iraq is contingent on effectively dealing with the strong nationalist overtones and religious underpinnings of its people. The ISF is no different. Cordesman notes that there are “truly national elements in virtually every part of the Iraqi security structure, many that act with great courage and integrity. Many, particularly in the Iraqi Army, are promising if -- and only if -- Iraq can achieve the level of political accommodation/conciliation that can hold the various sectarian and mixed areas together.”

To give the ISF the ability to command security obligations, the coalition must address two overriding factors: the sectarian power struggle within the ISF itself, and the lack of a cohesive U.S. plan for equipping the Iraqi military with the vision to pursue its work independently. First, a balance must be struck within the already pro Shiite character of the security forces. If Shiite and Kurdish power are to develop at the expense of the Sunnis, increasingly potent sectarian and ethnic power struggles can erupt. Second, the U.S. must strategically look beyond counterinsurgency operations to create forces capable of defending the country without the aid of coalition forces. One of the most pronounced flaws in current military strategy is the lack of foresight in creating an affordable and realistic plan for replacing U.S. military capabilities, intelligence, and sustainability.

The U.S. has strong ethical and moral obligations to the Iraqi people. This includes adequately getting its government and its citizens on their feet with the ability to autonomously rule as a sovereign nation-state. The failure to enact contingency plans for nation-building and stability operations following Saddam’s removal coupled with the ineffective organization of Iraqi security forces are only two badly incurred mistakes.

Looking to the future, the U.S. must first continue its efforts to push Iraq’s leaders toward political compromise and conciliation and second, force United Nations sanctioned talks that bring all of the regional powers to the negotiating table. Iraq is but a reflection of the wider Middle East dilemma we face today.

While President Bush and General Petraeus may see “bottom-up progress”, there is no illusion as to how far away we actually are from leaving Iraq with dignity.